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ABSTRACT 
Vinje, Daniel Martin; M.S.; Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics; College 
of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources; North Dakota State University; 
April 2006. The Effects of Deregulation on Rail Rates: A Study of Wheat, Barley, Com, 
Oat, and Soybean. Major Professor: Dr. John Bitzan. 
Although the original intent of this study was to do a pre-and post-deregulation 
assessment of rail rates per ton-mile, the results using post-deregulation data show a 
significant decrease in rail rates between 1981 and 2000. While accounting for changes in 
shipment characteristics, savings for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean shippers were 
63.80%, 69.17%, 49.07%, 67.97%, and 59.36%, respectively. Rate savings over time for 
an average 1981 shipment were 45%, 55%, 38%, 45%, and 36% for wheat, barley, com, 
oat, and soybean shippers, respectively. 
Analysis regarding the effects of deregulation of rail rates on com, soybean, and 
wheat on a regional basis shows that rail rates not only differ across commodities, but also 
among regions. In general, it was found that grain producers within regions that had higher 
levels of intermodal competition had lower rates than their counterparts with lower levels 
ofintermodal competition. Distribution of benefits as a result of market-based pricing has 
varied among regions, and these variances are increasing over time. 
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Background 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the passage of the Staggers Act of 1980, railroads were subject to close 
scrutiny imposed under regulation. Rates were set and coordinated by rate bureaus to 
equalization levels often benefiting the least efficient rail providers. Unprofitable branch 
lines were forced to be maintained and serviced, and railroad mergers were discouraged. 
Contract rates were limited to certain commodities (MacDonald, 1989). 
During the 1970s and into the early 1980s, major industries such as the 
communication, financial, and energy industries were undergoing regulatory reform. At 
this time, transportation industries were also experiencing initial acts of legislation that 
eventually progressed toward the reformation of the railroad industry. Congress began 
regulatory reform by offering more operating freedoms under the Railroad Revitalization 
and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976. The 4R Act gave the railroads greater pricing 
flexibility and eased restrictions on railroad track rationalization and mergers. Significant 
regulatory changes did not occur, however, until the introduction of confidential contract 
rates, regulatory exemption on certain commodities, and the encouragement of rail 
rationalization by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1979 (MacDonald, 1989). 
As summarized by MacDonald (1989) and others, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 
offered railroads the freedom to restructure rates and services and to discontinue services 
and abandon unprofitable service lines. The act also broadened the use of confidential 
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contract rates set between railroads and shippers. Cooperative rate equalization within 
regions was effectively eliminated through the elimination ofrate bureaus. This resulted in 
competitive pricing and the acceleration of restructuring shipments from single car 
shipments to multi-car or unit train movements. With the passage of the Staggers Act of 
1980, railroads were essentially deregulated, with the exception of routes for which they 
held market dominance. 
Economists predicted that regulatory reform would lead to lower prices and 
significant welfare gains to consumers (Winston, 1993), and several studies since 
deregulation have examined the accuracy of these predictions. These studies have 
examined rail rate changes, changes in railroad profitability, and railroad productivity gains. 
In general, studies have found that most shippers have benefitted from increased 
competition among railroads and from reductions in rail costs. Railroads have abandoned 
unprofitable branch lines, upgraded remaining lines, and restructured rates-providing 
incentives for shippers to use less costly shipping methods (MacDonald, 1989). 
The freedom to restructure rates from cost-based to market-based has provided 
incentives for railroads to reduce costs. Reductions in costs have been achieved through the 
abandonment of unprofitable rail lines, through increased traffic densities resulting from 
regaining previously lost traffic, 1 and from enhancements in rail technology (productivity 
gains). Further, many of these cost savings have been passed on to shippers. With the 
exception of certain commodities and shippers located in geographical regions where 
1For a recent analysis of cost savings resulting from increased traffic densities from 
deregulation, see Bitzan and Keeler (forthcoming in JLE, 2007). 
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demand for rail transportation is less elastic than others, railroads have not been able to use 
their rate-making freedom to earn excess profits (McFarland, 1989). 
As previously mentioned, studies have shown that increased productivity, decreased 
rates, and increased profitability in the rail industry can be attributed to deregulation. While 
evidence suggests that benefits have been shared by shippers, in terms of rate savings and 
improved service, the degree to which these benefits have been realized to bulk grain 
shippers needs to be examined further to serve as benchmarks for efficient design of future 
regulations. 
Problem Statement 
Although the number of studies into the effects of deregulation of railroads are 
numerous and the focus of research has varied, pressing legislative issues require current 
analysis of cost and benefit sharing. To correctly address the call to re-regulation brought 
about by the perceived disparity of a small group of bulk shippers such as those in regions 
with little intermodal and intramodal competition, further analysis must be conducted 
(Molinari, 2001 ). This study focuses on the effects of deregulation to shippers with 
differing levels of transportation competition, on how these effects differ between regions, 
and on the extent that rate savings/increases have been experienced between the period of 
deregulation up to the year 2000. 
Before making further policy changes in the way railroads are regulated, it is 
imperative that policy makers understand the full impacts of past regulatory change and the 
implications that such impacts have for formulating future rail transportation policy. This 
research will enhance the information base available to policy makers, such as Congress, 
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the Surface Transportation Board, and the United States Department of Agriculture, by 
documenting an important impact of past regulatory change. 
Objectives and Overview of the Thesis 
This study examines rail rate changes resulting from deregulation, with a focus on 
how rate changes have differed by commodity, level of competition, and changes in 
technology. Specific objectives of the study are listed below: 
( 1) Identify general grain commodity classifications to be used for rate analysis. By 
focusing on wheat, barley, corn, oat, and soybean separately, the varying rate structure 
within each grain commodity will be examined. 
(2) Formulate and estimate statistical rail rate models to examine the effects of 
deregulation on rates, focusing on differences among shippers with varying elasticities of 
demand for rail service. Specifically, the effects of variables affecting the elasticity of 
demand for rail service on deregulation rate impacts will be assessed. For example, the 
model will show how the effects of deregulation on rates have varied with differences in 
railroad concentration, the level of waterway access, and proximity to major markets. 
(3) Assess rail deregulation's impacts on rates, by commodities, and how they have 
varied for shippers in different regions. The assessment will include an application of rate 
function parameter estimates to hypothetical post deregulation shipments to illustrate the 
effects of factors influencing the elasticity of demand for rail service on rate changes 
resulting from deregulation. In addition, the assessment will examine the time effects of 
deregulation and how they have differed among grain commodities and regions. 
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The main section of this thesis begins with a Review of Literature. In the Review of 
Literature is a discussion of previous studies to examine the impact of deregulation on rail 
rates of commodities, effects on groups such as shippers, profitability of railroads since 
deregulation, and the impact of deregulation on rates within regions. In addition, a detailed 
discussion of two studies by MacDonald (1987, 1989) examines grain shipments and the 
effects of differing levels of intramodal and intermodal competition on rail rates. 
Following the Review of Literature, the thesis proceeds with a theory chapter that 
explains the theoretical basis of the empirical model used in this study. After the theory 
chapter, the empirical methods are discussed. This chapter explains the model formulations 
and variations in the dependent variable, Rate Per Ton-Mile (RPTM). This chapter also 
includes a detailed description of independent variables used in the model, with an 
explanation of expected signs. After this chapter, the study moves into a descriptive data 
section. It is in this chapter where the source of data is discussed, along with the strengths 
and weaknesses of using the Waybill Sample Data. The fifth chapter presents the Results 
of the estimations on rail rates for specific grain commodities within regions. Also, an 
examination into the variation of rates existing within the grain commodity, as well as the 
effects of time since rail deregulation, are presented. In the final chapter, there is a 
summarization of the findings and a discussion of policy implications. 
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CHAPTER2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The objective ofthis study is to investigate the rate structure in the rail industry and 
how it has changed as a result of deregulation, paying particular attention to the differential 
impacts that deregulation has had on rates within grain commodities, regions, and over 
time. This chapter examines the research that has been done in this area as follows. The 
first section introduces the readers to the history of the rail industry and how it operated 
under regulation. The second section gives an overall assessment of the effects of 
deregulation. The third section provides a background of research that has been conducted 
previously and the methods that the authors used in their studies. The final section 
highlights model formulations and discusses different sources of data used in the models. 
History of the Rail Industry Under Regulation 
In 1970, the bankruptcy of the nation's largest railroad, Penn Central, along with six 
other northeastern railroads, provided insight into the financial demise of the railroad 
industry under regulation. Penn Central was bailed out through the creation of a public 
corporation called Conrail as a result of The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 
(3-R Act) . Due to the possibility of other bailouts occurring, policymakers sought to 
remedy the profit-making restrictions imposed on the railroad industry by regulation. 
Congress sought regulatory reform to give railroads more operating freedoms in hopes of 
avoiding future bailouts by passing the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) 
Act of 1976. 
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The 4R Act gave the railroads greater pricing flexibility, and eased restrictions on 
railroad track rationalization and mergers. Significant regulatory changes did not occur, 
however, until the introduction of confidential contract rates, regulatory exemption on 
certain commodities, and the encouragement of rail rationalization by the ICC in 1979 
(MacDonald, 1989). 
In 1980, The Staggers Rail Act was enacted, representing one of the most dramatic 
changes in federal policy toward railroads since the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887-the 
Act responsible for creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The Interstate 
Commerce Act introduced railroad regulation based on the premise that the railroad 
industry was a natural monopoly that required ICC regulation. In contrast, the Staggers Act 
was based on the notion that competition is generally adequate to constrain any potential 
abuses by railroads (Fuller et al, 1987). 
The major aspects of the Staggers Act were (1) increased rail rate flexibility, 
(2) authorization of confidential shipper/rail contracts, (3) limited regulatory control over 
joint rates and routes, (4) provision for mandatory reciprocal switching agreements to 
encourage competition, and (5) accelerated abandonment and merger decisions (Babcock et 
al, 1985). 
The Staggers Act allowed railroads to negotiate individual and confidential contract 
rates with shippers for any commodity-a significant change from previous practice. 
Railroads were able to adjust their rates downward as a result of the new rate-making 
freedom, allowing railroads to compete more effectively with other modes of 
transportation, such as barges or trucks. 
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By stimulating competition and increasing operating freedom, deregulation gave the 
railroad industry the drive to transform itself by achieving a much better match between its 
huge physical plant and work force on the one hand, and available traffic on the other. 
Some of the transformations the industry made were decreasing network sizes from rail 
abandonment and the reduction of crew sizes. 1 Contracts were used to align cars and 
equipment with shippers' demands and to reduce vulnerability to problems caused by 
overcapacity. Other transformations were made, such as the expansion of the use of 
intermodal operations, double-stack rail cars, and computer systems to provide faster, more 
reliable services. Real operating costs per ton-mile have steadily declined since 
deregulation. Some of the 60% cost decline from 1980 to 1998 can be attributed to the 
long-run trend in rail's traffic mix to include a greater proportion oflow-cost bulk traffic, 
but a significant portion is due to deregulation (Peltzman & Winston, 2000). 
In the next section, previous studies of the effects of deregulation are examined. In 
general, these studies have found that railroads experienced increases in productivity and 
earnings, while shippers experienced a decrease in rail rates, since the passage of the 
Staggers Act. 
Overall Assessment of Deregulation 
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the effects of deregulation on 
rail profitability, costs, and rates. Although each study is unique, results in general have 
found that deregulation has increased earnings, increased rail productivity, and allowed 
1 For an analysis of the impacts of crew size changes on railroad costs, see Bitzan and 
Keeler (2003). 
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shippers to benefit through a decrease in rail rates. 
Some studies conducted prior to the Staggers Act suggested that railroads would 
reap either monopolistic profits or experience decreased profitability. However most studies 
conducted since deregulation have found decreased rail rates and increased rail profitability. 
Burton ( 1993) found that railroads have increased their responsiveness to both intramodal 
and intermodal competition since the passage of the Staggers Act. Burton concluded that 
railroads have shared productivity benefits of deregulation with rail shippers by offering 
lower rates for almost all commodities. 
In McFarland's (1989) study, railroads were not found to experience excess profits 
after deregulation. This finding discounts deregulation opponents' fear that railroad rate-
making freedom without regulatory supervision would lead to monopoly pricing. An 
extension to McFarland's study found that the indirect effect of deregulation was increased 
profit realized through reduced costs (Bitz.an, 1994). 
McFarland also found that labor productivity had substantially increased since 
deregulation, while shippers benefitted from improvement in service without an increase in 
rail rates. Wilson's (1992) aggregate study on 34 different commodity classifications over a 
17-year period suggests that advances in productivity dominated any adverse market power 
effects. Initially, rates for some commodities rose under deregulation, implying greater 
market power and modest cost savings. By 1988, however, deregulation resulted in lower 
rates for most commodity classifications. This suggests that advances in productivity 
dominated any adverse market power effects. Dennis (2000) estimated that shippers saved 
close to $28 billion per year, most of which is the result of railroad productivity gains. 
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In his study, McFarland suggests that shippers with highly inelastic demand for rail 
transportation, such as coal shippers, have seen rate increases. In their case study of the 
market for low-sulfur Wyoming coal, Atkinson and Kerkvliet (1986) found that since 
deregulation railroads and coal producers have engaged in price discrimination at the 
expense of utility buyers. Similarly, some argue that grain shippers in the Northern Plains 
have not received large benefits from deregulation due to their relative captivity to a 
particular railroad. Further, it has been argued that "captive" rail shippers have recently 
experienced rate increases. 
While many studies have generalized that shippers have benefited from the effects 
of deregulation, others such as McFarland's (1989) study have also pointed out that there 
were segments of shippers that have not benefited. In this study, this small segment of 
shippers can be characterized as experiencing increased shipping rates due to a lack of 
interrnodal and intramodal competition brought about through geographical conditions or 
rail-line abandonments. 
Moreover, some shippers have expressed concern about the perceived inequity of 
rail rates that has resulted from the use of unit trains in regions of the U.S. where 
intramodal and interrnodal competition have been minimal. To remain competitive, many 
shippers have invested in expanding their infrastructure to fulfill capacity levels and 
loading time restrictions required to qualify for unit train rates. The segment of shippers 
who have been unable to do so have complained that they have been treated unfairly. As a 
result of such concerns, the Senate recently introduced the The Railroad Competition Act of 
2005 "to help limit the impact of railroad monopolies on captive shippers" (Montana's 
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United States Senator Conrad Burns, 2005). 
The Railroad Competition Act of 2005 would clarify existing laws and direct the 
Surface Transportation Board (STB) to ensure effective competition among rail carriers at 
origins and destinations, maintain reasonable rates in the absence of effective competition, 
and maintain consistent and efficient rail transportation for rail shippers-including the 
timely provision of cars. The bill would also establish a final offer arbitration of rail rates 
disputes between shippers and the railroad companies (Montana's United States Senator 
Conrad Burns, 2005). 
Not surprisingly, groups such as Consumers United for Rail Equity (C.U.R.E.) 
along with sixteen associations representing wheat growers, utility companies, forest, 
chemical, cement, coal, and other industries are in support ohhis legislation (Stainsby, 
2005). The Association of American Railroads warns that this legislation would lead to 
reregulation which would result in reduced rail capacity, higher costs, reduced service, 
increased traffic on over-crowded highways, and ultimately a government bailout of the 
railroad industry (AAR, 2006). 
Whether such large changes in regulations are desirable depends, at least in part, on 
the extent to which past regulatory change has benefited shippers. If most shippers have 
gained from regulatory change, any potential benefits to a small group of shippers seem to 
be outweighed by the potential detriment to other shippers and the industry in general. A 
review of previous studies and the impacts of deregulation on rail rates demonstrates the 
various methods and models used and the differing results found in these studies. 
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Previous Studies 
Several studies about the effects of deregulation on railroad rates have been 
conducted. These studies have varied in their methods, model formulation, and level of 
data aggregation. For example, studies by Boyer (1987) and McFarland (1989) examine 
aggregate U.S. rail rates. Other studies, including those by Babcock et. al (1985), Barnekov 
and Kleit (1990), Burton (1993), and MacDonald (1989), examine changes in rail rates for 
different shippers of a specific commodity, such as coal or grain. Finally, studies by 
Wilson (1992) and Dennis (2000) have examined changes in aggregate rail rates for a 
variety of individual commodities. 
One of the first studies conducted after the passage of the Staggers Act was 
Boyer's (1987) aggregate study of railroad rate levels and market share. In contrast to most 
studies in this area, Boyer concluded that the most likely effect of deregulation was an 
increase in rates, although his estimations showed no statistically significant effects from 
deregulation. 
Two possibilities may explain the results of Boyer's study. In his examination of 
average revenues per ton-mile, individual rate changes may have been unobservable due to 
the use of aggregate data. The other possibility, as pointed out in Bitzan's (1994) study, is 
the low number of observations used in Boyer's estimations. 
In Barnekov and Kleit's (1990) dissaggregate study on coal and grain rates, the 
authors concluded that efficiency gains from deregulation were between $11.5 and 18.5 
billion per year. The authors found two fundamental faults with Boyer's study. First, 
according to the authors, the rate level model used was improperly specified, resulting in an 
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incorrect conclusion about how price was affected by deregulation. Second, Boyer's model 
fell short in examining the impacts of deregulation on cost levels and service quality by 
failing to look at the welfare gains due to more efficient methods and practices now allowed 
by deregulation. Rate declines should be considered as a result of net efficiency gains-and 
not just a transfer from producers to consumers. 
In their estimations, Barnekov and Kleit measure the gradual implementation of the 
Staggers Act in the context of a reduced form model. This countered the alleged 
misspecification of previous studies, which implied that effects of deregulation were 
immediately realized once Staggers was enacted. As pointed out by Barnekov and Kleit, 
deregulatory processes were proceeding at a slow pace before the Staggers Act, and once it 
was passed, it took many months for the Interstate Commerce Commission to execute the 
changes. It took railroads and shippers even longer to respond to the radical changes 
advised by the new law. 
According to Barnekov and Kleit, the most important aspect of the Staggers Act 
was the contract provision, which legalized rail service contracts, giving total 
confidentiality of contract rates and terms. Prior to 1980, very few contracts were made. 
However, by 1987 the rate at which contracts were made increased to 1650 per month. 
As the number of years since deregulation progressed, researchers such as Barnekov 
and Kleit (1990) and Wilson (1994) have concluded that railroad rates have in fact 
declined. Barnekov and Kleit estimated that annual welfare gains in the United States from 
rail deregulation were between $5.3 and $7.2 billion in lower rates to shippers, $5 to $10 
billion in reduced inventory-related logistic costs, less than $500 million in higher profits to 
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railroads, and slightly more than $700 million in savings to taxpayers. Therefore, their 
estimate of the total annual gain from rail deregulation was $11.5 to $18.5 billion. 
In an impact study of the Staggers Act on Kansas wheat markets by Babcock et. al 
(1985), the authors concluded that rail rate reductions appeared to be responses to market 
conditions created by many events, including a reduced export flow of wheat, surpluses of 
transport equipment, changes in transport technology and cost relationships, and others. 
Deregulation had allowed flexibility for adjustments to market conditions resulting in 
farmers benefiting from reduced rail rates. As a result, the authors suggested that although 
many small shippers adjusted well to deregulation, other small shippers feared possible 
injury through the dependence on a single railroad and their limited ability to negotiate with 
the carrier. 
One unique study that examined the effects of deregulation across 34 commodity 
classifications was conducted by Wesley Wilson (1992). Wilson's study found the 
theoretical effects of deregulation depended on the nature of pricing under regulation and 
deregulation, the level of cost savings, and the elasticity of demand. Deregulation would 
negatively influence rates if cost savings were achieved with little or no increase in market 
power. On the other hand, if market power increased as a result of deregulation, rates could 
increase. As a result, tradeoffs occurred between cost savings and increased markups over 
marginal costs. These tradeoffs produced price effects that varied across 
commodities-effects that were lost in studies of rates where all commodities were 
aggregated. 
His analysis of deregulation outcomes on 34 different commodity classifications 
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over a 17-year period suggested dramatic differences across commodity classifications, not 
only in terms of the magnitude of effects, but also in terms of direction. Initially, rates rose 
for the majority of commodities under deregulation, implying greater market power and 
modest costs savings. However, by 1988 deregulation produced lower prices in most 
commodity classifications and did not produce price increases in the other 
classifications-suggesting that advances in productivity had dominated any adverse market 
power effects. Variations in the effects of deregulation are partially explained by 
differences in the characteristics of commodities. 
Although the economic benefits to railroad deregulation are well established, policy 
issues have surfaced recently, primarily focusing on the reasons why railroad rates have 
declined since deregulation. On one side of the debate, a number of shippers claim that 
rates have fallen due to changes in railroad traffic characteristics such as an increasing 
percentage of bulk commodities, increased length of haul, and increased private ownership 
of equipment. On the other side, the railroad industry contends that the reductions are a 
result of cost savings due to heavier ladings, increased shipment size, and improved 
technology (Dennis 2000). 
In a recent study examining the impacts of deregulation on rail rates, Dennis (2000) 
examined railroad revenue per ton-mile over a variety of commodities. The top ten 
commodities accounting for ninety percent of rail revenue were selected. Dennis used a 
reduced form railroad rate equation to determine the factors influencing the decline of the 
railroad rates since the Staggers Act. In his study, Dennis determined that changes in 
commodity mix, length of haul, shipment size, lading weight, equipment ownership, 
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railroad costs, competition from other modes, and demand for railroad transportation were 
factors in railroad rates. By running separate regressions for each of ten major two-digit 
Standard Transportation Commodity Code (STCC) commodities, the commodity mix was 
controlled, and effects were allowed to vary across commodities. Data on traffic 
characteristics and the regression coefficients were used to calculate the total differential of 
the rate equation. Changes in revenue per ton mile were applied to 1996 commodity traffic 
levels to determine the annual savings to shippers. 
His estimations showed that, as a result of railroads' reduced revenue per ton-mile, 
shippers saved $28 billion per year in 1996 dollars between 1982 and 1996. Ninety percent 
of the rate reductions were due to productivity-adjusted railroad cost reductions. Increased 
length of haul and increased private ownership of equipment cited by some shippers 
accounted for only about 2% of the reduction in railroad revenue per ton-mile since 
deregulation. 
Another series of studies were James MacDonald's disaggregate studies of grain rail 
rates and their change as a result of deregulation. His research of the significance of 
intermodal competition and intramodal competition on rail rates for specific commodities is 
of particular relevance to the current study. 
In MacDonald's (1987) study of com, wheat, and soybean rail shipments from 
domestic production areas to ports for export, it was found that the farther a shipper was 
from competing water transportation, the higher rail rates were. In addition, he found that, 
as the number of railroads competing in a region increased, rail rates declined. His 
estimations also found that there was some interaction between interrnodal and intramodal 
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competition. The closer the shipper was to water competition, the less important was the 
influence of intramodal competition. 
In the 1987 study, MacDonald chose to focus on the export shipments of com, 
wheat, and soybean due to the ability to observe variations in competitive conditions across 
disaggregated locations. This was accomplished by using the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) Annual Rail Waybill Sample data for 1983. According to MacDonald, 
fundamental market characteristics such as grain market demand elasticities, spoilage, or 
loading characteristics do not vary across origin locations. Thus, rate differences are due to 
differences in shipment characteristics such as length of haul, size and competition. 
In the case of com, competition among railroads and among railroads and barges 
constrain rail rates in several ways. First, elevators with favorable transport rates can offer 
higher bid prices to farmers, attracting grain away from competing local elevators that may 
be served by competing railroads. Second, elevator operators facing high rail rates can ship 
by truck (short-haul rail) to other elevators on competing rail or barge lines. The critical 
factor in restraining railroad market power in the first two cases is the cost of truck 
transport (MacDonald, 1987). Finally, some elevators are served by competing rail or barge 
lines. In this case, elevators will ship on the railroad offering lower rates. 
Elevator operators marketing wheat and soybean in the Com Belt area have the 
same alternatives as those marketing com. Elevators operating in the wheat production 
centers in the Southern Plains (Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas}, the Northern Plains 
(Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Montana, and Minnesota), and the Northwest 
(Washington and Idaho), face a different shipping scenario. Wheat areas have poor access 
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to competing water transport in comparison to com and soybean production areas (except 
for Washington locations, which are near to the Columbia River). In 1987, the eastern parts 
of the plains states usually had access to several rail lines, but other areas only had access to 
one or two railroads (MacDonald, 1987). 
MacDonald also concluded that water competition appeared to be far less important 
for wheat, and that wheat regions had a low number of intra rail competitors. With the 
geographic restriction to water access, shippers in the major wheat regions with limited 
intermodal and intramodal competition were also more likely to be captive shippers and 
single carload sellers. He also found that commodities differed in shipment sizes. Com 
usually moved in unit trains, while wheat moved in small one- to three-car shipments at the 
time of the study.2 
In an extensive study for the United States Department of Agriculture published in 
1989, MacDonald examined the effects of railroad deregulation on grain transportation. In 
the study, he addressed the issue of whether the effects of deregulation varied across 
regions and commodities. MacDonald chose to use wheat, com, sorghum, barley, and 
soybean as the focus of his study for several reasons. His primary reason for examining 
grain was the wide dispersal of grain production across the United States. Second, the 
accuracy of the assessment regarding the effects of competition on rail rates as a result of 
deregulation could be validated with these commodities due to the wide variety of 
competitive conditions that occur across grain regions. Finally, unobservable dimensions 
'In a study by Vacha!, Bitzan, and Tolliver (1996), the authors found that unit train use in 
1994 had virtually equaled other types of multi-car options in the transportation of North 
Dakota grain and oilseeds. 
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of service quality, such as speed, reliability of service, and susceptibility to damage, were 
less important for grain than for other commodities. 
Consideration was given by MacDonald to the use of publicly quoted tariff rates, 
origin-destination grain price spreads, and the Waybill Sample as sources of data for his 
estimations. The Waybill Data Sample was chosen because it was the only source to 
measure shipment sizes and rates that could be used to determine commodity flows 
between regions. The one major drawback of the Waybill Sample was the inaccuracy of 
reported unit train movements prior to 1981, particularly for coal and corn. 
Results of MacDonald's regression analysis suggested that wheat rates dropped an 
average of 21. 7% in the years 1981-1985 with no controls for shipment size shifts, and 
15.5% with controls. Corn rates declined by 12.4% with no controls, and 8.4% with 
controls. According to his analysis, about 30% of the rate decline could be attributed to the 
spread of multiple-car and unit train use. 
Competition among railroads was also found to have had a strong effect on rates. 
Lower rates were found to be associated with an increase in the number of competitors, 
which was especially true when the distance from barge competition was increased. In 
MacDonald's estimation, wheat shippers located 500 miles from water competition paid 
rates 36% greater than shippers 100 miles away. Corn rates also increased with distance 
from water competition, though the increase was smaller due to corn producers' close 
proximities to water competition. Corn shippers 200 miles away paid rates 6.2% greater 
than shippers 75 miles away from water competition. 
MacDonald concluded the following: Staggers Act reforms accelerated the cost-
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reducing adaptations of multiple-car and unit train operations. This shift would also lead to 
a greater trend toward consolidation of grain merchandising, resulting in fewer but larger 
elevators. This may have lead to rural road deterioration, as farmers invested in heavier 
trucks to move loads greater distances. 
Deregulation also introduced competition among railroads in regions with evidence 
of effective cooperation before Staggers. MacDonald also found that Class I railroads had 
reduced their systems through abandonments and sales, and many short-line and regional 
railroads had taken over light-density branch lines. 
The next chapter discusses the methodology, model, and data used in determining 
rate differentials among regions in the United States using grain movements for wheat, 
barley, com, oat, and soybean from 1981 to 2000. 
20 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the theory of rail rate determination, the specific model used 
to estimate rates with an explanation of variables used and their expected signs, and 
simulations designed to demonstrate the impact of intermodal and intramodal competition 
on rail rate savings. 
Theory 
One of the objectives of this study is to determine if captive shippers realized the 
same rate savings from deregulation as shippers located in markets with more 
transportation options. As previously discussed, a combination of geographical and 
competitive factors' affect the elasticity of demand for rail service. Shippers located in 
regions such as western North Dakota and Montana experience higher rail rates due to a 
more inelastic demand for rail transportation in comparison to areas with more 
transportation options. Differences in the demand elasticities for rail transportation between 
regions is accounted for by the differences in proximity to competitive modes of shipping 
and by differences in railroad to railroad competition. Increased intermodal options, such as 
nearby water access and close proximity to terminal markets, make elasticity of demand for 
'Although geographic and product competition are not measured directly, their influence 
on demand elasticity is reflected in different rates across different commodities. 
Geographic competition is competition among railroads able to supply the same product to 
a destination, but originating at different sources, or competition among railroads able to 
ship an originating product to different destinations. Product competition is competition 
among railroads at different locations in shipping substitute products. 
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rail service higher. Shippers who have an increased number of railroad (intramodal) 
options from which to choose will also experience lower rates for a particular rail service 
due to a higher elasticity of demand for a particular railroad's service. 
Rail rates are determined by the interaction of the demand for rail service and 
supply of rail services. As demand for rail by shippers increases, rates increase. 
Conversely, rates decline as demand for rail service decreases. Moreover, factors that 
increase the elasticity of demand for rail service will decrease rates. As costs increase, 
supply decreases and causes an increase in rates, while rates will decrease if cost decreases. 
In this study, rail rate per ton-mile is specified as a reduced form equation of 
variables affecting the supply and demand for rail services. 
where 
R = R(c,d,t), 
R= Rate per ton-mile 
c = a vector of operating and supply characteristics 
d = a vector of variables affecting demand 
t = time trend since deregulation 
(1) 
Revenue per ton-mile ( also referred to as "rate per ton-mile") is a function of 
operating and supply characteristics, demand factors, and time. 2 The vectors of operating 
and supply characteristics include factors influencing costs such as the rail distance from 
origination to destination, the commodity weight per car, and the number of cars per 
2Time trend is an indicator of technological changes and changes in pricing practices 
since deregulation over time. 
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shipment. 3 Cost relationships should be reflected in rates since relevant demand factors are 
also controlled. Distance, commodity weight per car, and cars per shipment all have an 
inverse relationship with rail costs per ton-mile and are expected to have an inverse 
relationship with rate per ton-mile. 
The distance to barge loading facilities is used as a variable influencing demand 
elasticity.4 Since commodity movements by barge are a major competitor to the rail 
industry for long-haul shipments of bulk commodities, it would be expected that, as the 
distance from barge loading facilities increases, elasticity of demand for rail service will 
decrease and rate per ton-mile will increase. 
Another demand variable measures the market share of each railroad in the 
originating counties and the number of railroads (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). It is 
expected to have a positive relationship with rate per ton-mile. Defined as the sum of the 
squared market shares (tons) of all railroad firms in the county of origin, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index measures the market power of railroad firms in a county. This number 
falls between O and 1, with O representing perfect competition and I representing a pure 
monopoly. Higher railroad market power is associated with a lower elasticity of demand 
for a particular railroad's service and, consequently, higher rates. 
30ther railroad rate studies have used similar operating and supply characteristics. For 
example see MacDonald (1989) or Bitzan (1994), or for other variations of the rate model, 
see McFarland (1989). 
4Ibid. 
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n 
Herf= I (s,'), (2) 
jaaJ 
where S; = Share of railroad i in all railroad tons of grain originating in a county. 
Model 
This study presents an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of rail rates per 
ton-mile for all wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean movements by rail in the continental 
United States for the years 1981 to 2000. All continuous variables, except time, are in 
natural logarithms, which allows the coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. 
The specific model used to estimate the impact of deregulation on rail rates per ton-
mile for grains in this study for the years 1981 through 2000 is as follows: 
lnRPTM = /30 + /31 In CARS+ /3, lnLOAD+ /33 lnSHRT+ /34 lnBDIST + /35 TTME + 
/36 lnHERF + /31 lnGPROD+ /38 TCOMP+ /39 TIME* lnBDIST + 
/310 TIME * lnHERF + /311 Sl + /312S2 + /313Sl * lnBD/ST + 
where 
/314S2 * In BDIST + & J 
RPTM = Rate per ton mile 
CARS = Number of cars per shipment 
LOAD= Commodity weight per car 
SHRT = Shipment distance in miles 
BDIST= Distance from nearest barge loading facility 
(Measured from the center of originating county) 
TIME= Time indicator 1981= 0, 1982=1,1983=2 ... 2000=19 
HERF = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
GPROD =Total U.S. grain production (1000/bushels) 
TCOMP = Truck competition; dummy variable; 1 if termination of shipment is 
within 279 miles, 0 otherwise. 
S 1 = Seasonal indicator; dummy variable December-March 
S2 = Seasonal indicator; dummy variable April-July 
24 
(3) 
As several components of rail costs, such as cost of switching, classifying, and 
loading cars, are fixed with respect to distance, they decrease on a per-mile basis as 
distance increases. Costs and rates per mile should decline with distance, according to 
MacDonald (1989). Short line miles (SHRT), which is defined as the shortest rail distance 
between origin and destination, is used to measure distance. Because demand variables are 
also accounted for, an inverse relationship is expected between distance and revenue per 
ton-mile.5 
LOAD ( commodity weight per car) should have a negative relationship with rate 
per ton- mile, since the cost per ton-mile decreases with increases in shipment weight. 
Costs such as clerical, switching, and labor costs remain the same regardless of weight per 
car. Thus, increases in the average weight per car should reflect negatively on rates per ton-
mile. 
Similarly, CARS should also have an inverse relationship with rates per ton mile. 
Switching yard and classification costs increase very little with shipment size, as do labor 
and administration costs. Therefore, costs per ton decline with increasing tonnage due to 
increased shipment sizes, (MacDonald, 1989). 
Two demand variables capture variations in the elasticity of demand for rail 
service. One, HERF, measures the level ofintramodal competition, while BDIST measures 
5This model assumes that the parameter estimates stay the same over time, with the 
exception of the two demand elasticity parameter estimates. Changes in demand elasticity 
parameter estimates reflect changes in rate making from cost-based pricing to market-
based pricing over time since deregulation. 
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the level of intermodal competition. HERF is expected to have a positive relationship with 
rail rates. Defined as the sum of the squared market shares (tons) of all railroad firms in the 
county of origin, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures the market power of railroad 
firms in a county. This number falls between O and I, with O representing perfect 
competition and 1 representing a pure monopoly. HERF decreases with increasing 
numbers of carriers and increases with rising inequalities among a given number of carriers. 
In this study, it is expected that HERF should have a positive relationship with rates. That 
is, as the market power of carriers increases (indicative of Jess railroad-to-railroad 
competition), rates increase. 
Distance to nearest barge loading facilities (BDIST) is also expected to have a 
positive influence on rates. Despite their limited flexibility to serve origins/destinations 
and handle small shipments, barges are very active in the grain industry. They offer the 
low-cost alternative for Jong distance, bulk-product shipments. As the distances from barge 
competition increases, rates are expected to increase. In this study, BDIST is used to 
measure the strength of intermodal competition. The greater the distance from a barge 
loading facility, the Jess likely that elevators will use the truck/barge combination due to 
higher costs. (i.e., Trucks are more competitive at shorter distances.) 
Another demand variable measuring the level of intermodal competition is truck 
competition, TCOMP. TCOMP is a dummy variable that is 1 if the termination of rail 
movement is within 279 miles of origination; 0 otherwise. A study by Tolliver and Bitzan 
(1997) found that at distances less than 279 miles, trucks are cost competitive with rail. 
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TCOMP is expected to have a negative sign due to a higher elasticity of demand for rail 
service for truck competitive shipments. 
A variable that measures the overall level of demand for grain rail service in this 
study is GPROD. It is defined as the total U.S. annual grain (wheat, barley, com, oat, 
sorghum, rye, and soybean) production as cited on the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service website. It is expected that the relationship between RPTM and GPROD will be 
positive, signifying that as the demand for rail shipment increases, rail rates will increase. 
To measure the impact of deregulation on rail rates, the TIME variable will show 
the year-to-year trend in RPTM. TIME is expected to be inversely related to RPTM, as the 
rail industry has had greater pricing flexibility and cost savings in the deregulated 
environment. Originally, the intent of this study was to evaluate rail rates pre and post 
deregulation. However, it was deemed necessary to limit the study to the years after 1981, 
due to inaccuracies found in pre-deregulation data. 6 
Included in the model were interaction terms to allow an assessment of the differing 
impacts of deregulation as a result derived from differing levels of transportation 
competition and over time. TIME*HERF is expected to have a positive relationship with 
rail rates due to increased pricing flexibility from deregulation. As railroads pursue more 
market-based rates as a result of deregulation, factors influencing demand elasticity should 
be more important in determining rates. 
The interaction term TIME*BDIST should also have a positive relationship with rail 
6This will be covered further in the next chapter. 
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rates. The more competitive rail pricing becomes as the passage of time since deregulation 
increases, the larger the influence of intermodal competition on rates. 
When the intermodal and intramodal competition variables are interacted with 
TIME, (i.e., TIME*HERF or TIME*BDIST), it is to be expected that the positive 
relationships with rail rates would be reinforced further as time passes since deregulation, 
due to a switch from cost-based pricing to market-based pricing. 
To measure the seasonal effects of rail rates, the dummy variables SI and S2 were 
introduced into the model. SI equals I, if the period when the origination of rail movement 
is between the months of December and March, or O if otherwise. Similarly, for S2 equals 
I if the origination of rail movement is between the months of April and July, or O if 
otherwise. These variables are interpreted in relation to season 3 (August-November), 
which is the dummy left out of the model. Signs for SI and S2 are expected to be negative, 
since the demand for rail shipments will decrease during the winter and spring months, 
resulting in a decrease in rail rates. 
SI and S2 are interacted with In BDIST to measure the different effects on rail rates 
from barge competition when movements on the Upper Mississippi are reduced or 
terminated during winter freeze-up.7 The resulting interaction terms SI *BDIST and 
7 According to the office of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers located in St. Paul, Minnesota, 
winter freeze-up for the Upper Mississippi is between the months of December and March. 
Although the actual period during which river barge movement is terminated due to 
freezing conditions is shorter than four months, the locks and dams are generally closed 
during the period of December through March due to maintenance and repairs. 
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S2*8DIST are expected to capture effects of barge competition on rates during the periods 
between December and March (S 1 ), and April through July (S2). It is expected that the 
sign for SI *BDIST will be negative, as the rate discipline introduced by barge competition 
is limited during this period. In the next section, partial derivatives of the base model will 
be highlighted to show how time effects vary with different levels of intramodal and 
intermodal competition. 
Derivatives 
To determine the impact intermodal and intramodal competition have had on rail 
rates since deregulation, this study will use simulations based on partial derivatives taken 
from the base model equation for the following grain commodities: wheat, barley, com, oat, 
and soybean. The total effect of time since deregulation on rate per ton-mile can be 
determined by taking the partial derivative of the equation for RPTM with respect to time 
as follows: 
olnRPTM 
- 0-T;-im-e-=/35 + /J9 *lnBD1ST+ /J 10*lnHERF 
(4) 
Since both interaction terms are expected to have a positive relationship with RPTM, it is 
expected that rate decreases over time will be smaller for areas with less intramodal and 
intermodal competition. One purpose of this study is to determine if captive shippers have 
experienced rate changes differently than shippers faced with more, elastic demand. This 
can be illustrated by simulating the time effects for various levels of intramodal and 
intermodal competition using the above derivative. 
An alternative way to look at the same problem is to ask how the role of 
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competition is influencing rate changes over time. If captive shippers have experienced 
lower rate decreases as a result of deregulation, then competitive variables have become 
more important in determining rates. To isolate the effects of intermodal competition on 
rail rates over time, the partial derivative of the natural log ofRPTM with respect to the 
natural log ofBDIST is taken. This equation is mathematically shown as follows: 
olnRPTM 
olnBDIST = /34 + /J9 TIME (5) 
This is interpreted as the percentage change in RPTM given a l % change in distance 
to the nearest barge loading facility. In this study, the partial derivative will depend on time 
since deregulation. Simulating the effect ofBDIST on RPTM in the time period 
immediately after deregulation up to the year 2000 is accomplished by setting TIME at 
those periods (i.e., 0 = 1981, l = 1982, 2 = 1983, ... , 19 = 2000). It is expected the effect of 
intermodal competition will have a stronger influence on rates over time since deregulation. 
That is, as more time passes since the implementation of deregulation, the greater the 
positive relationship on rates for shippers located farther away from intermodal 
competition. This is based on the theory that pricing for rail services switched from cost-
based to market-based pricing. 
To isolate the effects of the level ofintrarnodal competition on rail rates over time, 
the partial derivative of the natural log ofRPTM with respect to the natural log ofHERF is 
calculated mathematically shown as follows: 
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olnRPTM 
olnHERF = /36 + /J10TIME (6) 
1bis is interpreted as the percentage change in RPTM given a 1 % change in the 
level of intramodal competition as represented by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The 
parameters /36 and /310 are also expected to have positive signs. lntramodal competition is 
expected to increase in importance over time. Equivalently, as the time since deregulation 
increases, a given increase in concentration will have a bigger influence on rates. Whether 
higher concentration plays a more important role over time will be assessed based on this 
partial derivative. 
1n the next chapter, data will be discussed, specifically the variables derived from 
the Waybill Data. Descriptive statistics will also be presented. 
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CHAPTER4 
DATA 
This chapter will discuss in detail the data set used in the empirical model, along 
with the advantages and disadvantages of Waybill Sample Data. Explanations of how some 
variables are calculated for use in the model are also provided. 
The primary source of data for the analysis is the Surface Transportation Board's1 
(STB) Annual Rail Waybill Sample, Master File for the period 1981-2000.2 This provides 
a data set rich in both cross-sectional and time-series information. Initially, approximately 
244,000 observations were in the data set. After eliminating outliers and missing data, 
about 240,000 observations are included in the sample. 
When utilizing the Waybill Sample it is important to consider cautions of Wolfe 
(1986) concerning the sampling rate, contract revenue, billed vs. actual weight, and the 
Accounting 11 Rule. Wolfe points out that the under-reporting of unit train movements 
prior to deregulation may have led to an inaccurate sampling rate. Instead of a 1 % sampling 
rate from the years 1946 to 1980, it is suggested that the rate was actually between 0.8% 
and 0.9%. For this reason, this study does not use pre-1981 data. Caution is also given to 
using contracted revenues in any analysis due to the possibility of overstatement of rail 
1Formerly known as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 
2Initial attempts were made to extend the scope of the study by including the Annual Rail 
Waybill Sample Master File from 1972 through 2000. After considering cautionary 
remarks from the STB concerning the accuracy of the pre-1981 data, it was deemed 
necessary to drop the data from the study in order to ensure accurate results. 
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revenues in order for rail companies to retain confidentiality. However, recent analysis 
suggests this impact is small.3 Using billed weights could also lead to biased results due to 
a difference between billed and actual weights, which is estimated to affect 2% of the data. 
It was difficult to make an assessment of the consistency between billed and actual weight 
in this study since actual weight is missing in most cases. Finally, Wolfe (1986) points out 
that the use of Accounting Rule 11, which allows railroads to rebill long-distance traffic as 
local movements, can make single-line movements appear to be two separate moves. There 
is no way to assess the extent of this problem for the current study. 
Another issue to address is that, prior to 1984, the variable for short-line miles was 
often left blank in the Waybill Sample. To correct for this, short-line distances between an 
origin and destination county in years later than 1984 were used to fill in the prior omitted 
distances. It was assumed that the distance from county A to county B was the same, 
regardless of what year the shipment occurred. Two variables added to the Waybill Sample 
were distance to the nearest barge loading facility and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HERF) is calculated as the sum of all railroad firm shares 
squared in the county of origin (Equation 2). The level of intermodal competition was 
measured by using highway distances to the nearest barge loading facility (BDIST) from the 
county in which the rail shipment originates. 
'Dennis (2000) addressed Wolfe's (1986) cautions by comparing rate per ton-mile 
(RPTM) data derived from the Waybill Sample to those derived from the Association of 
American Railroads' (AAR) Freight Commodity Statistics (FCS) database. 
Dennis found that an overall adjustment factor of 3% was needed for both revenue and 
tonnages in the Waybill Sample database to match FCS values. 
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Descriptive statistics for wheat, barley, and corn shipments are discussed in the next 
section-specifically weighted averages for rate per ton (RPT}, rate per ton-mile (RPTM), 
SHRT (distance of shipments), LOAD ( commodity weight per car), CARS (number of cars 
per shipment), distances to nearest barge loading facility (BDIST), and the average for 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HERF). 
Tables 4.1-4.5 present weighted averages ofrates, distances, weights per car, 
shipment size, and competitive variables for wheat, barley, corn, oat, and soybean, 
respectively. In general, averages RPTM, representing rates per ton-mile in real terms, 
respectively, are decreasing after the implementation of deregulation: 58%, 71 %, 46%, 
74%, and 56% for wheat, barley, corn, oat, and soybean, respectively. However, regional 
effects cannot be evaluated by these tables. Another item worth noting is that corn has had 
lower RPT and RPTM than wheat and barley before and after deregulation, possibly due to 
the geographic location of originating corn shipments and the earlier use of unit-train 
shipments.• This is also reflected in the higher number of cars for corn in comparison to 
the lower number for wheat and barley. The average in the number of cars per shipment for 
each commodity has increased overall, and in some cases significantly, since 1981: 438%, 
311 %, 465%, 95%, 874% for wheat, barley, corn, oat, and soybean, respectively. 
Average shipment distances for wheat, barley, oat, and soybean show a shift from 
shipments terminating regionally toward terminating at distances further away since 
4MacDonald ( 1989) found that 94% of corn shippers originate within 200 miles of ports. 
Corn export movements were primarily accomplished by unit-trains or multi-car shipments 
prior to 1981. 
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Table4.l. Wheat weighted averages, 1981-2000. 
Year RPT* RPTM** SHRT LOAD 
1981 28.93 0.062 463.56 94.94 
1982 26.45 0.045 581.49 100.29 
1983 25.85 0.045 575.96 98.29 
1984 21.25 0.038 559.01 97.92 
1985 19.82 0.038 521.68 97.00 
1986 18.21 0.031 581.57 96.47 
1987 17.04 0.028 598.83 96.58 
1988 17.61 0.028 615.37 95.98 
1989 15.80 0.029 543.24 92.70 
1990 18.73 0.029 647.86 91.89 
1991 18.40 0.026 702.75 96.11 
1992 18.95 0.026 730.20 97.60 
1993 20.81 0.028 746.03 97.95 
1994 23.15 0.031 758.86 94.11 
1995 22.47 0.029 778.51 98.28 
1996 22.29 0.028 808.90 98.81 
1997 22.20 0.029 770.46 97.75 
1998 20.79 0.029 728.43 99.63 
1999 20.47 0.027 747.65 100.54 
2000 19.60 0.026 766.46 101.70 
* = Rate per ton. 
** = Rate per ton-mile. 
***=Distance to barge loading facility. 
**** = Herfindex for Stec (01) Farm commodity. 
RPT and SHRT = Averages weighted by ton. 
RPTM = Averages weighted by ton-mile. 
LOAD= Averages weighted by cars. 
CARS= Averages weighted by expansion factor. 
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CARS BDIST*** HERF**** 
1.41 226.44 0.751 
2.28 232.27 0.769 
2.78 239.06 0.789 
3.70 228.26 0.739 
3.71 238.17 0.755 
4.51 235.49 0.773 
5.21 240.88 0.781 
6.55 223.68 0.774 
9.05 214.97 0.783 
7.54 236.67 0.802 
8.57 231.87 0.799 
8.75 255.92 0.799 
8.86 264.56 0.802 
6.60 245.50 0.772 
5.71 254.38 0.792 
5.87 238.78 0.808 
5.23 237.93 0.688 
5.81 237.73 0.819 
5.84 229.95 0.820 
7.59 226.06 0.864 
Table 4.2. Barley weighted averages, 1981-2000. 
Year RPT* RPTM** SHRT LOAD 
1981 40.21 0.092 432.30 83.92 
1982 36.46 0.049 736.39 85.83 
1983 34.30 0.054 628.51 87.47 
1984 31.97 0.056 561.90 87.23 
1985 29.57 0.050 580.65 89.29 
1986 29.81 0.039 745.61 89.78 
1987 25.35 0.037 679.19 89.75 
1988 28.05 0.040 697.77 89.50 
1989 27.03 0.039 689.88 89.94 
1990 29.15 0.035 829.61 90.06 
1991 28.54 0.031 902.34 90.35 
1992 24.44 0.033 738.31 90.66 
1993 26.02 0.030 862.75 91.69 
1994 21.73 0.033 658.06 90.31 
1995 22.96 0.035 653.55 91.85 
1996 23.32 0.031 751.93 92.91 
1997 21.75 0.029 729.07 92.62 
1998 20.67 0.030 672.72 93.80 
1999 21.17 0.028 749.74 95.12 
2000 22.17 0.027 795.37 94.16 
* = Rate per ton. 
** = Rate per ton-mile. 
***=Distance to barge loading facility. 
**** = Herfindex for Stec (01) Fann commodity. 
RPT and SHRT = Averages weighted by ton. 
RPTM = Averages weighted by ton-mile. 
LOAD= Averages weighted by cars. 
CARS= Averages weighted by expansion factor. 
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CARS BDIST*** HERF**** 
1.04 241.44 0.729 
1.14 262.86 0.836 
1.44 285.15 0.847 
1.54 294.74 0.850 
1.39 282.73 0.831 
1.76 289.73 0.819 
2.40 288.67 0.840 
2.32 247.35 0.823 
2.28 264.10 0.796 
2.51 274.23 0.794 
2.60 270.68 0.816 
3.04 283.34 0.851 
3.73 292.72 0.852 
3.45 257.58 0.662 
3.04 253.55 0.797 
2.99 266.22 0.845 
3.26 247.35 0.638 
2.96 238.71 0.800 
2.94 262.43 0.826 
4.27 275.91 0.824 
Table 4.3. Com weighted averages, 1981-2000. 
Year RPT* RPTM** SHRT LOAD CARS BDIST*** HERF**** 
1981 29.62 0.037 790.22 94.13 2.25 96.34 0.771 
1982 23.40 0.031 748.28 96.96 4.31 79.61 0.757 
1983 23.21 0.031 742.86 96.72 5.37 82.80 0.729 
1984 24.32 0.028 842.63 96.59 6.45 90.11 0.751 
1985 18.88 0.025 737.02 96.24 6.60 80.31 0.759 
1986 17.30 0.025 673.65 96.56 6.26 72.51 0.752 
1987 16.60 0.023 694.19 96.15 7.76 79.37 0.788 
1988 17.43 0.023 736.58 96.44 9.02 88.55 0.790 
1989 17.46 0.023 750.29 96.33 10.27 91.60 0.793 
1990 17.92 0.024 738.77 95.23 8.97 91.88 0.802 
1991 17.92 0.024 721.78 94.86 9.31 91.80 0.808 
1992 17.25 0.025 688.90 95.51 9.48 91.00 0.814 
1993 17.08 0.024 690.28 95.32 9.44 83.94 0.802 
1994 16.40 0.025 637.89 95.45 8.66 84.47 0.751 
1995 19.98 0.022 878.59 97.49 9.68 89.95 0.724 
1996 18.89 0.023 804.73 98.50 8.16 93.07 0.740 
1997 19.68 0.023 853.39 96.43 10.06 96.57 0.650 
1998 17.95 0.022 788.14 100.42 11.13 91.41 0.772 
1999 18.03 0.021 843.35 101.58 10.66 95.06 0.767 
2000 18.13 0.020 897.40 101.61 12.72 91.29 0.775 
* = Rate per ton. 
**=Rate per ton-mile. 
*** = Distance to barge loading facility. 
**** = Herfindex for Stec (01) Farm commodity. 
RPT and SHRT = Averages weighted by ton. 
RPTM = Averages weighted by ton-mile. 
LOAD= Averages weighted by cars. 
CARS = Averages weighted by expansion factor. 
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Table 4.4. Oat weighted averages, 1981-2000. 
Year RPT* RPTM** SHRT 
1981 33.16 0.095 
1982 32.40 0.046 
1983 29.72 0.063 
1984 25.35 0.061 
1985 22.09 0.052 
1986 21.22 0.048 
1987 19.49 0.044 
1988 15.89 0.047 
1989 14.72 0.044 
1990 14.96 0.046 
1991 13.61 0.044 
1992 16.39 0.037 
1993 14.91 0.034 
1994 13.38 0.033 
1995 17.30 0.033 
1996 19.32 0.031 
1997 18.50 0.031 
1998 16.48 0.031 
1999 17.37 0.029 
2000 16.37 0.025 
* = Rate per ton. 
**=Rate per ton-mile. 
349.84 
712.09 
473.57 
413.33 
425.00 
445.38 
442.33 
337.20 
336.54 
325.41 
312.17 
445.47 
444.97 
401.33 
532.94 
634.22 
606.23 
536.89 
606.53 
655.17 
***=Distance to barge loading facility. 
LOAD 
62.32 
67.62 
69.46 
71.46 
72.35 
73.07 
75.23 
75.98 
75.77 
76.55 
77.61 
76.47 
78.72 
80.68 
82.06 
82.20 
81.23 
79.82 
84.52 
84.68 
**** = Herfindex for Stec (01) Fann commodity. 
RPT and SHRT = Averages weighted by ton. 
RPTM = Averages weighted by ton-mile. 
LOAD= Averages weighted by cars. 
CARS = Averages weighted by expansion factor. 
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CARS BDIST*** HERF**** 
1.06 97.97 0.723 
1.06 133.78 0.794 
1.30 157.86 0.751 
1.40 144.28 0.747 
1.20 177.40 0.771 
1.25 130.56 0.706 
1.28 188.84 0.735 
1.70 129.86 0.738 
2.39 125.07 0.673 
2.27 102.57 0.607 
2.27 118.56 0.671 
2.41 145.25 0.780 
2.53 105.47 0.646 
3.32 119.31 0.525 
2.34 101.43 0.536 
1.54 115.70 0.634 
1.64 130.62 0.591 
2.02 125.70 0.695 
1.99 91.12 0.575 
2.07 79.76 0.808 
Table 4.5. Soybean weighted averages, 1981-2000. 
Year RPT* RPTM** SHRT LOAD CARS BDIST*** HERF**** 
1981 20.14 0.046 442.90 92.79 1.60 64.61 0.997 
1982 18.81 0.033 573.94 97.27 3.10 79.85 0.997 
1983 15.72 0.034 464.SS 96.SS 4.17 81.20 0.996 
1984 15.71 0.033 480.63 95.66 5.07 79.15 0.811 
1985 13.75 0.030 457.15 94.72 4.42 87.18 0.805 
1986 12.77 0.024 525.18 95.63 5.09 81.64 0.765 
1987 11.62 0.022 519.30 95.40 6.60 77.51 0.799 
1988 13.27 0.025 521.08 94.40 7.34 81.25 0.796 
1989 13.64 0.026 513.56 94.78 6.35 85.25 0.794 
1990 13.20 0.026 504.01 94.83 6.98 86.48 0.823 
1991 13.13 0.025 SI 7.91 95.22 8.55 85.45 0.807 
1992 13.54 0.024 559.72 95.26 9.58 79.69 0.819 
1993 13.60 0.023 580.68 95.82 10.29 83.65 0.830 
1994 12.77 0.023 556.99 96.76 8.40 93.05 0.803 
1995 15.49 0.022 695.90 95.96 8.09 102.94 0.765 
1996 15.43 0.023 675.26 97.22 7.99 111.01 0.744 
1997 16.03 0.022 723.58 96.42 9.14 119.59 0.703 
1998 15.26 0.022 701.21 97.19 8.54 122.15 0.760 
1999 16.15 0.021 763.73 98.64 9.52 136.14 0.775 
2000 16.39 0.020 831.77 97.66 15.58 111.45 0.789 
* = Rate per ton. 
** = Rate per ton-mile. 
***=Distance to barge loading facility. 
**** = Herfindex for Stec (01) Farm commodity. 
RPT and SHRT = Averages weighted by ton. 
RPTM = Averages weighted by ton-mile. 
LOAD= Averages weighted by cars. 
CARS= Averages weighted by expansion factor. 
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deregulation, possibly due to an increase in exports or a shift in the location of terminals for 
these commodities. Percentage increases in shipment distances are 65%, 84%, 14%, 87%, 
and 88% for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean respectively Averages for LOAD of all 
commodities show an increase, illustrating the change from 70-ton cars to 100-ton hoppers. 
Percentage increase in weight per car is 7%, 12%, 8%, 36%, and 5% for wheat, barley, 
corn, oat, and soybean, respectively. 
Average distances to barge load facilities (BDIST) for wheat and barley are higher 
than the other commodities. Wheat and barley producers, in most cases, are located in 
geographic locations where intermodal competition is less available. Average distances in 
miles to nearest barge loading facilities is 236, 269, 88, 126, and 92 for wheat, barley, corn, 
oat, and soybean, respectively. HERF averages also indicate a slight shift toward an 
increase in market power of railroads competing within a county in most commodities with 
the exception of soybean. Average percentage increase/decrease in the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is 15%, 13%, 0.5%, 12%, and -21% for wheat, barley, corn, oat, and 
soybean, respectively. 
In the next chapter, the parameter estimates of rate models for wheat, barley, corn, 
oat, and soybean are presented, along with simulations of rate changes among regions. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, the parameter estimates of the regressions for wheat, corn, barley, 
oat, and soybean are highlighted. Discussion is also given to simulations used to estimate 
how deregulation impacts have varied with varying levels of intermodal and intramodal 
competition and within regions for corn, soybean, and wheat. Finally, conclusions and 
policy implications are presented. 
Empirical Results 
Overall, the estimated model provides a good explanation of variations in rail rate 
per ton-mile. As shown in Table 5.1 for most of the grains covered in this study, over 70% 
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the models.' For the most part, 
the estimated models show the expected relationships between the explanatory variables 
and the rail rates per ton-mile. 2 As expected, the natural log of the number of rail cars 
(!CARS) and the commodity weight of each car per shipment (!LOAD) have negative signs 
and are significant. This suggests that as the number of cars and the commodity weight of 
each rail car increases, the rate per ton-mile decreases. The natural log of the distance per 
shipment (ISHRT) is negative and significant, suggesting that, as the distance per shipment 
'Oat R-square was 68%. 
2Exceptions include the wheat model, in which the interaction variable TIME*ln HERF 
has an unexpected negative sign and is insignificant. 1n the barley model, TIME*ln 
HERF is negative. In the corn model, lnHERF, and TIME*BDIST are unexpectedly 
negative. 1n the oat model, IHERF is insignificant, and TIME*ln HERF has an unexpected 
negative sign. 1n the soybean model, lnBDIST, and TIME*lnHerf have unexpected 
negative signs. 
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Table 5. 1 Base model for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean. 
Wheat Barley Com Oat Soybean 
Variable 
(Standard Error) 
Intercept -1.33* 1.99* 1.42* 0.541 -0.336** 
(0.13423) (0.22941) (0.11062) (0.484) (0.19045) 
!car -0.06* -0.038* -0.056* -0.057* -0.031 * 
(0.00143) (0.00355) (0.00089) (0.00913) (0.0017) 
!load -0.301 * -0.677* -0.724* -0.526* -0.716* 
(0.00579) (0.01551) (0.00492) (0.01653) (0.00824) 
lshrt -0.646* -0.612* -0.46* -0.597* -0.544* 
(0.00219) (0.00337) (0.00173) (0.00877) (0.00308) 
lbdist 0.113* 0.066* 0.03* 0.019* -0.011 * 
(0.00217) (0.00278) (0.00185) (0.00589) (0.003) 
time -0.036* -0.062* -0.015* -0.038* -0.046* 
(0.00106) (0.00147) (0.00082) (0.00278) (0.00133) 
lherf 0.059* 0.323* -0.019* 0.021 0.282* 
(0.00594) (0.01261) (0.00495) (0 .. 02303) (0.01228) 
lgprod 0.025* 0.122* 0.0971* 0.157* 0.240* 
(0.00810) (0.01340) (0.00664) (0.02939) (O.Oll49) 
tcomp -0.069* -0.1375* -0.043* -0.084* -0.058* 
time*lbdist 0.0009* 0.004* -0.002* 0.001 ** 0.004* 
(0.00019) (0.000276) (0.00018) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
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Table 5.1. (continued) 
Wheat 
Variable 
(Standard Error) 
time*lherf -0.00028 
(0.00067) 
sl -0.388* 
(0.00386) 
s2 -0.011 * 
(0.00352) 
sl *lbdist 0.024* 
(0.0017) 
s2*lbdist 0.018* 
(0.0016) 
Observations 99484 
Adjusted R-sq 0.7142 
* = Significant at 1 % level. 
** = Significant at 5% level. 
* * * = Significant at 10% level. 
Barley Com 
-0.025* 0.008* 
(0.00127) (0.00048) 
-0.011 *** -0.001 
(0.00649) (0.00276) 
0.005 0.02* 
(0.00683) (0.00285) 
-0.005** 0.013* 
(0.000211) (0.00128) 
-0.005** -0.007* 
(0.00208) (0.00124) 
21803 110442 
0.7981 0.6885 
lcar = Natural logarithm of number of cars per shipment. 
lload= Natural logarithm of commodity weight per car. 
lshrt= Natural logarithm of shipment distance in miles. 
Oat 
-0.004*** 
(0.00214) 
-0.009 
(0.01289) 
0.013 
(0.0139) 
-0.003 
(0.00601) 
-0.011 ** 
(0.00587) 
4304 
0.7372 
lbdist= Natural logarithm of distance from nearest barge loading facility. 
time= Time indicator 1981 =O, 1982= 1, 1983=2 ... 2000= 19. 
lherf= Natural logarithm Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
lgprod= Natural logarithm of total U.S. grain production(lOOO/bushels). 
Soybean 
-0.017* 
(0.00109) 
-0.022* 
(0.0047) 
-0.002 
(0.0051) 
-0.011 * 
(0.00266) 
-0.009* 
(0.00215) 
30864 
0.7638 
tcomp= Truck competition; dummy variable; 1 if termination of shipment is within 279 
miles, 0 otherwise. 
sl= Seasonal indicator; dummy variable December-March. 
s2= Seasonal indicator; dummy variable April-July. 
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increases, rail carriers pass on economies realized. The distance to the nearest barge loading 
facility (IBDIST) is positive' and significant at the 1 % level, indicating that shippers 
experience an increase to the rail rate per ton-mile as the distance to the nearest barge 
loading facility is increased. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (lHERF) is positive,4 
indicating that rail rate per ton-mile increases as intramodal competition decreases. The 
natural log of the total grain production in the United States (lGPROD) is positive and is 
significant. This suggests that, as total grain production increases, demand for rail shipments 
increases, resulting in an increase in rail rates per ton-mile. 
Other variables of interest in this study are the time, truck competition, and seasonal 
dummies. The time variable (TIME), which in this study is used to measure the 
deregulation effect, is significant and negative for all grains. This indicates that, as time 
since deregulation increases, rail rates per ton-mile decrease. The effect of truck 
competition (TCOMP) is negative, suggesting that, if the distance of a rail shipment was 
within 279 miles, rail rates per ton-mile decreased due to the increased likelihood of truck 
competition. 
The interaction variable TIME*ln BDIST is positive' and significant at the .05 level, 
suggesting that intermodal competition has a bigger influence on rates as time since 
3 With the exception of soybean having a negative coefficient for IBDIST. 
4 IHERF for com is negative, and lHERF for oat is insignificant. 
'Interaction term TIME*ln BDIST is negative for com. 
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deregulation increases. When time is interacted with the natural log of Herfindahl- Index 
(TIME*lnHERF), the sign is unexpectedly negative.6 It was expected that increased 
market-based pricing would make intramodal competition more important in determining 
rates after deregulation. 
The unexpected negative signs may reflect technology improvements in the trucking 
industry and elevator capacity. As the trucking industry has increased its trailer lengths and 
fuel economy, it has increased economical shipping distances, resulting in an important 
intermodal alternative. Elevators have increased their capacities to accommodate unit-trains 
and remain competitive. As a result, these larger elevators are competing over larger areas. 
Consequently, the concentration of railroads in a particular county may no longer be a 
relevant measure of intramodal competition. That is, while concentration within a county 
probably represented a good indicator of the role played by cross country competition in 
limiting rates in 1981, concentration over a much broader area is probably more appropriate 
today. 
When seasonal dununies, season I and season 2, are interacted with the natural log 
of barge distances, (SIFBD and S2FBD respectively), interactions are negative with the 
exception of the wheat model. This suggests the influence of intermodal competition is less 
significant on rail rates during these particular time periods. 
One of the primary objectives of this study is to determine the effect that time had on 
rail rates since deregulation for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean. Since deregulation 
6Time*lnHerf for com is positive and significant. For oat, Time* lnHerf is significant 
at the I 0% level. 
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occurred in 1980, changes in rates after 1981 reflect the effects the deregulation has had on 
rail rates.7 Figure 1 shows simulated rate per ton-mile for wheat, barley, com, oat, and 
soybean when placing all variables, except time, at the 1981 mean levels for the entire 
period. 
The simulation shows the changes in rates that have occurred for an average 
Rates Per Ton-Mile, 1981-2000 (Current Prices) 
0.1 -
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Figure I. Time effect simulation of rates per ton-mile for wheat, barley, com, oat, and 
soybean, 1981-2000. 
7Due to a Jack of pre-deregulation data, the change in rates over time does not necessarily 
identify a deregulation impact. It is possible the post-deregulation trend was a continuation 
of a pre-deregulation trend. Nonetheless, the large negative impacts of time on rates are 
strongly suggestive of a deregulation impact. 
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shipment solely due to changes in the parameters over time. 8 This simulation might be 
considered the direct effect of deregulation.9 In general, rail rates for wheat, barley, com, 
oat, and soybean have decreased since 1981. However, the differences in rates between 
commodities have diminished toward the year 2000. The overall percentage decrease in 
RPTM due to time only is 45%, 47%, 38%, 45%, and 44% for wheat, barley, com, oat, and 
soybean, respectively. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the percentage changes in rates of shipments simulated at 
yearly mean levels for all variables, relative to 1981. These simulations potentially 
demonstrate the direct and indirect influence that deregulation had on rates, including those 
from increases in shipment size, length of haul, weight, etc. However, it is important to note 
that this study has not identified the impact of deregulation on those other variables. It is 
likely that shipment size, length of haul, weight, etc. increased due to a variety of factors as a 
result of deregulation. 
As the figures show, all five commodities show significant decreases in rates relative 
to 1981. The most dramatic decrease in rates in the year 2000 relative to 1981 occurred for 
wheat, barley, and oat with percentage decreases in rates in the upper 60% range: 64%, 67%, 
and 69%, respectively. Com experienced the lowest percentage decrease in rates at 49% 
with soybean following at 59%. 
The simulations represented in Figures 2 and 3 also show an immediate drop in rate 
"Recall that BDIST and HERF are interacted with time. 
9Indirect effects of deregulation may also have occurred due to changes in shipment size, 
distance, load factors, or concentration from deregulation. 
47 
0 
-10% 
• g, -20% 
5 
• CJ) -30% 
• gi --40% 
'c 
~ -50% 
• a. -60% 
-70% 
1~ 1~1~1~1~1~1m1~1~1~,~ 1m1~1•1~1~1•1~1~2a 
Year 
- Wheat Barley - - Soybeans 
Figure 2. Cumulative percentage decrease in rates for wheat, barley, and soybean, 1981-2000, 
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Figure 3. Cumulative percentage decrease in rates for corn and oat, 1981-2000, relative to 
1981. 
per ton-mile during the initial couple of years after deregulation took effect, with a slight 
trend adjustment in the mid- l 980s for all grains. During the latter 1980s rates per ton-mile 
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continued a downward shift until 1993-1994. At this time period rates for all grains 
increased, then shortly after continued to decrease but at a slower rate. 
To better demonstrate the overall effect of time on rates since deregulation, Figure 4 
shows the simulated rates for an average shipment of wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean 
from 1981 to 2000 at their respective mean levels. In this simulation, it is apparent that 
differential pricing among grain commodities did exist prior to or at the implementation of 
deregulation. Along with a dramatic decrease in rates over time since deregulation, it would 
appear there is a general convergence in rates during 2000. In the next section, an analysis 
of rail industry deregulation on rate differential among com, soybean, and wheat by regions 
is presented. 
Rate Per Ton-Mile (Current Prices) 
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Figure 4. Simulated rates for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean, 1981-2000. (All 
variables are placed at their mean levels.) 
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Regional Rail Rate Simulations for Corn, Soybean, and Wheat 
In this section, simulations estimate rate per ton-mile for com, soybean, and wheat to 
examine if there were differences in rail rate savings on a regional basis. Figure 5 shows the 
regions and the states that make up each region. 10 
Com, soybean, and wheat accounted for approximately 92% of U.S. grain and 
oilseed production (60%, 17%, and 15% respectively) from 1996 and 2000 considering 
Pacific Northwest 
et Centn,1 P lains 
S ourthem Ptams 
Figure 5. USDA production regions. 
V\leslem 
Com 
Belt E astern 
Corn 
Belt 
Souuieast 
10Pacific Northwest= Washington, Oregon, Idaho. West= California, Nevada, Utah, 
Arizona. Northern Plains = Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota. Central 
Plains= Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas. Southern Plains = New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas. 
Western Com Belt= Minnesota, Iowa. Delta= Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi. Eastern 
Com Belt = Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio. Northeast= Maine, New 
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia. Southeast= Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Florida. 
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production of eleven primary grains and oilseeds 11 (National Agricultural Statistic Service 
(NASS), 2003). The marketing and production characteristics for com, soybean, and wheat 
vary, resulting in unique transportation demand functions among and within commodities. 
For example, the primary origin states for com and soybean are similar, with Iowa and 
Illinois as the leaders in production. Wheat, in contrast, is concentrated west of the 
Mississippi in Kansas and North Dakota. In addition to the more western production region, 
wheat has subclasses including durum, spring, and winter. The qualities associated with 
these classes create distinct, yet interrelated, wheat markets with varying transport system 
demands and abilities. In comparison, com and soybean products are each generally treated 
as homogeneous commodity markets with a high degree of substitutability within products, 
considering the range of quality characteristics. 
Another difference in these grain commodities is their markets. Approximately 80% 
of com production is used domestically. In contrast, only 65% of soybean, and 60% of 
wheat is consumed domestically. These differences contribute to the important differences 
in transport service demand for com, soybean and wheat across time and geography. 
Figures 6 through 11 illustrate average shipment and competitive characteristics for 
com rail shipments from 1981 to 2000 across ten regions. Figure 6 shows the average cars 
"Other commodities included in the U.S. grain production total are barley, cottonseed, 
flaxseed, oat, rice, rye, sorghum, and sunflower. 
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per shipment for com shipments 1981 to 2000 and by originating region 12 1981 to 2000. 
The average number of cars per shipment may be an indicator of rail investment by the 
origin regions to the degree it can be realized with access to markets capable of receiving 
larger rail shipments. As the figure shows, all regions averaged three or fewer cars per 
shipment in 1981, while all but two averaged five cars or more per shipment in 2000. The 
Western Com Belt region had the largest increase in the number of cars per shipment in 
2000 with an average of 26 from an average of two cars per shipment in 1981. This 
increase in shipment size may indicate an increased level of shipper investment by the 
Average Number of Cars (Corn) 
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Figure 6. Average number of cars by originating region for com, 1981-2000. 
12CP = Central Plains, D = Delta, ECB = Eastern Com Belt, NE= Northeast, 
VV VVCB 
NP = Northern Plains, PNW = Pacific Northwest, SE = Southeast, SP = Southern Plains, 
W = West, and WCB = Western Com Belt 
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expansion of elevators to accommodate larger shipments, in order to take advantage of rail 
marketing incentives. 
Figure 7 shows short-line distance by region13 in 1981-2000 for rail com shipments. 
Most regions did not experience large increases in distances of shipments, with the 
exception of the Western Com Belt which increased shipment distance from 540 miles to 
approximately 800 miles from 1981 to 2000. This shift in distance may be attributed to, as 
mentioned previously, factors such as greater consolidation at origin points in response to 
railroad marketing incentives and technological advances in grain production that have 
affected the production geography and density. 
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Figure 7. Average short-line distance by originating region for com, 1981-2000. 
13CP = Central Plains, D = Delta, ECB = Eastern Com Belt, NE = Northeast, 
NP= Northern Plains, PNW = Pacific Northwest, SE= Southeast, SP= Southern Plains, 
W = West, and WCB = Western Com Belt. 
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As Figure 8 shows, the average distance from the nearest barge loading facility for 
com rail origins14 is higher for Northern Plains, Southern Plains and West regions. Areas 
with origins close to barge loading facilities are located in the Delta, Eastern Com Belt, 
Pacific Northwest and Southeast regions. Most of the production of com in the United 
States is in close proximity to barge loading facilities. This could explain lower rates for 
com as compared to wheat rates along with the high production of com and its 
substitutability as feed products. 
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Figure 8. Average distance of shipment origins from nearest barge loading facility for 
com, 1981-2000. 
14CP = Central Plains, D = Delta, ECB = Eastern Com Belt, NE = Northeast, 
NP = Northern Plains, PNW = Pacific Northwest, SE= Southeast, SP = Southern Plains, 
W = West, and WCB = Western Com Belt. 
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Figure 9 shows the average Herfindahl Index of origin railroad concentration by 
region for the years 1981 to 2000. Five regions showed an increase in concentration over 
the 1981 to 2000 time period. The Pacific Northwest and West regions remained the same 
while the Eastern Com Belt, Northeast, and Western Com Belt decreased in concentration 
slightly over the 1981 to 2000 time period. Increases in concentration may reflect 
consolidation of rail companies along with the abandonment of unprofitable rail lines as 
well as larger unit-train facilities. 
Herfindahl Index (Corn) 
1 -,-
--
0.6 -1 
0.4 
0.2_J 
o~ 
CP D ECB NE NP PNW SE SP w WCB 
] 1981 2000 
Figure 9. Average Her:findahl Index of origin railroad concentration by region for com, 
1981- 2000. 
Figure 10 shows the simulated average com rail rates by region in 1981 to 2000 
obtained by placing all variables at mean levels by region and year. As the figure shows, 
large differences in rates exist among the regions in 1981 , the initial year in the study that 
was reflective of rates effective under deregulation. During the 1981 to 2000 time period, 
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decreases in rates averaged 37% across regions. Rate decreases ranged from 33% in the 
Delta to close to 40% in the Southern and Northern Plains. 
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Figure 10. Simulated com rates by region, 1981-2000 (all variables placed, except for time, 
at their 1981 mean levels for the region). 
To gain more insight into the rate savings on com shipments, simulations on rate 
savings due to the time trend and due to changes in time and independent variables were 
conducted. Changes due to the time trend reflect differences in intermodal, intramodal, 
geographic, and product competition among regions, while changes due to changing 
independent variables reflect changes in shipment efficiency due to larger and longer 
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shipments and changes in demand elasticity variables. 
Figure 11 shows the changes in these rates as simulated by the time trend and by the 
. 
changes in shipment characteristics added to the time trend. As the figure shows, the 
W estem Coin Belt, Central Plains, and Southern Plains experienced the largest decreases in 
rates attributable to the time trend. The region experiencing the largest rate savings as a 
result of changes in shipment characteristics and time was the Western Com Belt region, as 
a result of its large increases in average shipment distances and average shipment size 
during this period. 
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Figure 11. Simulated com rate savings due to time trend and due to changes in time and 
shipment characteristics, 1981-2000. 
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Soybean 
Rate savings for soybean shippers have varied just as they have for com shippers. 
Figures 12 through 1715 show shipment characteristics. Figure 12 shows the average :ail 
cars per shipment for soybean, 1981-2000, by region. 16 As for com, all regions averaged 
fewer than two cars per shipment in 1981, while only the Delta and South East regions 
averaged fewer than four cars per shipment in 2000. In comparison to com, the increase in 
shipment size for soybean rail shipments has been much larger. In 2000, the Eastern Com 
Belt, Northern Plains, Southern Plains, and Western Corn Belt regions averaged 17 cars per 
shipment, the largest increase in shipment size was 32 or more cars for the Central Plains 
region. As with corn, the increase in soybean shipment sizes during the 1981 to 2000 time 
period may be a result of rail marketing initiatives and the smaller geographic distribution 
of soybean production. 
Average short-line distance, or the shortest rail distance between two points, for 
soybean shipments by region is shown in Figure 13. As illustrated in the figure, large 
increases in shipment distance occurred in the Central Plains, Southeast, and Western Com 
Belt regions. 
15 As in the case of corn, for illustrative purposes abbreviations will be used: CP = Central 
Plains, D = Delta, ECB = Eastern Corn Belt, NE= Northeast, NP= Northern Plains, 
PNW = Pacific Northwest, SE= Southeast, SP= Southern Plains, W = West, and 
WCB = Western Corn Belt. 
16The Northern and Southern plains had too few shipments in 1981 to ensure reliable 
shipment mean characteristics. 
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Average Number of Car per Shipment (Soybeans) 
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Figure 12. Average number of cars per shipment by originating region for soybean, 
1981-2000. 
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Figure 13. Average short-line distance by originating region for soybean, 1981-2000. 
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As shown in Figure 14, the average distances of origin points from the nearest barge 
loading facilities are shorter for soybean than for com, overall. This is because areas most 
well suited to soybean production are closer to barge loading facilities. This would explain 
why soybean rates in comparison to com rates are similar, while in contrast to wheat rates, 
soybean are less due to the overall geographical differences in production. 
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Figure 14. Average distance of shipment origins from the nearest barge loading facility 
for soybean, 1981-2000. 
Figure 15 shows the average Herfindahl Index of origin railroad concentration for 
soybean shipments in 1981 and 2000, by region. Central Plains, Delta, and Eastern Com 
Belt regions show an increase in origin railroad concentration between 1981 and 2000. 
Simulated soybean rates by region are shown for 1981 and 2000 in Figure 16. Rail 
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rates for soybean differ within regions. However, in general all regions experienced large 
decreases in rates between 1981 and 2000. 
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Figure 15. Average Herfindahl Index of origin railroad concentration by region for 
soybean, 1981-2000. 
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Figure 16. Simulated soybean rates by region, 1981- 2000. (All variables, except for 
time, are placed at 1981 mean levels.) 
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Figure 17 shows the simulated soybean rail rate savings for the regions between 
1981 and 2000. The largest rate savings from the time trend alone are for the Central 
Plains, Delta, Southeast, and Western Com Belt regions. The elasticity of demand for rail 
transportation in these regions is probably high due to the increased level of transportation 
competition. This is probably due to these regions close proximity to export markets or 
feed markets. Central Plains, Northern Plains, Southeast, and Western Com Belt regions 
experienced the greatest rate savings from changes in shipment characteristics. These 
regions experienced more than a 53% increase in shipment distance. The Eastern Com Belt 
and Delta regions only experienced 7% and 12% increases in shipment distances, which 
correspond to their lower percent rate savings due to shipment characteristics. 
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Figure 17. Simulated soybean rate savings due to time trend and changes in time and 
shipment characteristics, 1981-2000. 
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Wheat 
Figure 18 shows the average cars per shipment for wheat shipments in 1981 and 
2000, by region. All regions17 averaged fewer than four cars per shipment in 1981 while 
only three regions averaged fewer than four cars in 2000. These regions, the Northeast, 
Southeast, and West, are primarily feed grain and small mill destinations, so there is little 
incentive for local shippers to invest in expanding rail capacity. Over the 1981 to 2000 
period, several regions (Central Plains, Northern Plains, Southern Plains and Western Com 
Belt) experienced large increases in shipment size. Given the increases in the size of 
shipments in these regions during this period, it would seem that shippers have increased 
their rail origination capacity to take advantage of rail rate incentives in their markets. 
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Figure 18. Average cars per shipment by originating region for wheat, 1981-2000. 
17 As in the case of com, for illustrative purposes abbreviations wi11 be used: CP = Central 
Plains, D = Delta, ECB = Eastern Com Belt, NE = Northeast, NP = Northern Plains, 
PNW = Pacific Northwest, SE= Southeast, SP= Southern Plains, W = West, and 
WCB = Western Com Belt. 
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Figure 19 shows the average short-line distance of wheat shipments for 1981 and 
2000, by region. The shipment distance reflects incentives for inland shipment 
consolidation, including those related to trucking costs associated with production 
agriculture and those related to efficiency gains available to elevators, railroads, and 
terminal markets. During the 1981 to 2000 time period, the largest percentage increases in 
shipment distance were for the Southern Plains, Northern and Central Plains, and the 
Pacific Northwest, ranging from 53% to 44%. 
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Figure 19. Average short-line distance of wheat shipments by region, 1981-2000. 
WCB 
Figure 20 shows the average distance of origin rail points for wheat from the nearest 
barge loading facility. As the distance from waterway access increases, the level of 
intermodal competition decreases accordingly. As shown in the figure, shipments 
originating in the Central Plains, Northern Plains, Southern Plains, and West regions 
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experienced limited intermodal competition while those in Eastern Com Belt, Delta, and 
Southeast experienced heavy intermodal competition. 
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Figure 20. Average distance of shipment origin from the nearest barge loading facility for 
wheat shipments, 1981-2000. 
Figure 21 shows the average Herfindahl Index of origin railroad concentration for 
wheat shipments in 1981 and 2000 by region. Six regions show an increase in origin 
railroad concentration, while the other four show a decrease. These decreases in the Eastern 
Com Belt, Northeast, and Southeast generally show an increase in level of rail competition 
over the eastern regions of the Unites States. This is possibly due to the larger number of 
small railroads that operate in the East and greater track density as compared to the West in 
1981. Increases in railroad concentration in the western regions may reflect a greater 
number of rail abandonments and the overall increase of consolidation among railroad 
companies. 
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Figure 21. Average Herfindahl Index of origin railroad concentration by region for 
wheat shipments, 1981-2000. 
Figure 22 shows simulated wheat rates by region for the time period of 1981 to 
2000. As was the case for the other commodities, there were large decreases in rates over 
time that averaged 45% across the regions. The Southeast, Eastern Com Belt, and the Delta 
regions experienced approximately 46% decreases in rates. 
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Figure 22. Simulated wheat rates by region, 1981-2000. (All variables, except for 
time, are placed at their 1981 mean levels for the region.) 
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Figure 23 shows the simulated overall wheat rate savings due to time trend and as a 
result of changes in rates due to time controlling for shipment characteristics. Regions 
realizing 45% savings or more from the time trend include three regions with a great deal of 
transportation competition (the Western Corn Belt, the Eastern Corn Belt, and the Delta 
region), and three that are major destination points for feed grain (the Southern Plains, the 
Central Plains, and the North East). This was to be expected since areas with waterway 
competition and nearby access to export facilities and areas with major feed markets where 
trucks are an alternative mode of transporting grain are likely to have a higher elasticity of 
demand for rail transportation. Due to a move to competitively determined rates as a result 
of deregulation, areas with high demand elasticity for rail transport are the areas where rate 
savings should be the highest. When examining the rate savings attributable to changes in 
shipment characteristics, areas with the largest gains relative to the time trend alone are the 
Central Plains, Eastern Corn Belt, Northern Plains, Pacific Northwest, Western Corn 
Belt,and the Southern Plains at 65%, 66%, 66%, 64%, 64%, 63%, and 70%, respectively. 
These areas realized increases in average shipment distance and increases in shipment size 
between 1981 and 2000. 
As deregulation has had a negative impact on rates over time, it is expected that 
demand elasticity variables will play a more important role over time as shifts from cost-
based to market-based pricing occur. In the following section, further discussion will be 
given to intennodal and intramodal competition, and their role in determining deregulation 
impacts. 
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Figure 23. Simulated wheat rate savings due to time trend and due to changes in time 
controlling for shipment characteristics, 1981-2000. 
Intermodal and Intramodal Competition Simulations 
To demonstrate the effects of intermodal and intramodal competition on rail rates 
per ton-mile over time since deregulation, simulations were conducted with results shown 
in Tables Al through A.10 (Appendix) for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean, 
respectively. Tables A.1, A.3, A.5, A.7, and A.9 show estimated rates in 1981 and 2000 for 
varying levels of intermodal competition. 18 Tables A.2, A.4, A.6, A.8, and A. IO show the 
estimated rates in 1981 and 2000 for different levels of intramodal competition. 
180btained by varying distances from the nearest barge loading facilities while holding all 
else constant. 
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In 2000, wheat shippers have experienced between 63 to 67% savings in rail rates 
compared to 1981 rates, depending on various levels ofintermodal competition.19 1n 
comparison, barley shippers experienced a 66 to 78% rate savings, com shippers a 
experienced 40 to 52% rate savings, oat shippers realized a 66 to 71 % rate savings, while 
soybean shippers experienced a 53 to 70% rail rate savings. 20 
1n general, as expected it was found that when shippers for all grains21 are located at 
or next to barge loading facilities, rail rates are at their lowest. Conversely, the greater the 
distance that a grain shipper is from a barge loading facility, rail rates increase. This was 
true, for most of the grains in 1981 and 2000, with the exception for com.22 1n 
MacDonald's (1985) estimation on export movements to the Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific ports, 
191n this study, varying levels of intermodal competition are accomplished by running 
simulations keeping all the parameter estimates of the grain commodity regression models 
at their respective mean level, with the exception of distance to the nearest barge loading 
facility. 
20These distances are based on distances to the nearest barge loading facilities that 
shippers within certain states encounter when determining the mode of transport for their 
commodity. This allows an analysis of the geographical effect ofintermodal competition. 
Distances of 50 miles to the nearest barge loading facility would be typical of the 
following states: Washington, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Distances of 100 miles: 
Georgia and Iowa. Distances of200 miles: Minnesota and Oklahoma. Distances of250 
miles: Kansas and Nebraska. Distances of 300 miles: South Dakota. Distances of 400 
miles: North Dakota. Distances of 500 miles: Wyoming and Montana. Finally, distances 
of 550 miles to the nearest barge loading facility would be typical for the state of Utah. 
21 Soybean rail rates decreased as competitive intermodal pressure was decreased due to a 
negative coefficient for In Bdist in the regression. 
22Simulated 2000 rates for com were flat regardless of an increase in distance to the 
nearest barge loading facility. 
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and ports on the Great Lakes, wheat shippers 500 miles from water competition paid rates 
36% greater than shippers 100 miles away. In comparison, this study finds that rail 
shipments 500 miles away from barge competition payed 24% higher rates in comparison 
to those l 00 miles away from barge competition, and rail rates per ton-mile in 2000 were 
26% greater for shippers 500 miles away in comparison to l 00 miles away. Rail rates for 
shippers SO miles from a barge loading facility experienced significant increases compared 
to shippers within a mile of barge loading facilities. In 1981, rates were 48% greater at SO 
miles from barge facilities in comparison to 1 mile from barge loading facilites, and in 
2000, rates were approximately SO% greater. Thus, direct barge access offers a distinct 
advantage to shippers since they have experienced greater rate savings in comparison to 
shippers located without direct access to barge facilities, and acts as a major constraint on 
rail rates. 
In Tables A.2, A.4, A.6, A.8, and A.10, the results of intramodal competition on 
rail rates per ton-mile for wheat indicate that rate savings range from 63.92% to 64.13% 
when compared to 1981 rail rates. Barley shippers saved between Sl.84% and 71.S2%. 
Rail rates for oat shippers produced a savings of 66.S9% to 69.03% in 2000 compared to 
I 981 rates. Soybean shippers also realized a savings of 4S.S9"/o to 62.18% during the same 
time period. In the case of barley, oat, and soybean, results indicate an increase in the 
market power of competing railroads within a county, resulting in larger decreases in rail 
rates, the opposite effect of what logic would dictate. A potential reason for this is that the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index within a county may not be an appropriate measure of 
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intramodal competition. 23 
Competitive effects for intramodal competition in wheat and com (Table A.2 and 
A.6) confirms that as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index approached 1.00, signifying 
monopolistic market power, rates increased in comparison to those markets experiencing 
lower levels of intramodal competition. Rail rates increase when shippers have an inelastic 
demand for rail. 
Table A.11 shows the influence ofBDIST and HERF on rates for wheat, barley, 
com, oat, and soybean in 1981 and 2000. Clearly, intermodal competition has increased in 
importance for wheat, barley, oat, and soybean. Longer distances to barge loading facilities 
mean less intermodal competition considering I% percent increase in the distance to the 
nearest barge loading facility in 198 I resulted in a 0.11 % increase in rail rate per ton-mile. 
In 2000, a I% increase in the distance to the nearest barge loading facility resulted in a 
0. 13% increase in rate per ton-mile. For barley shippers, a 1 % increase in the distance to the 
nearest barge loading facility resulted in an increase of 0.07% in 1981, and an increase of 
0.14% in 2000. For oat it was found that a 1 % increase in the distance to the nearest barge 
loading facility resulted in an increase of 0.019% in 1981 and an increase of0.043% in 
2000. 
The parameter for the time interaction with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
origin railroad concentration shows unexpectedly decreasing importance over time for all 
commodities except corn. 24 This is possibly due to the increasing importance of truck 
23Explained further at the end of the section. 
24 Corn intramodal elasticity increased from -0.019 in 1981 to 0.139 in 2000. 
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competition as one of the market factors in rate setting. As trucks increase in size and 
length of haul, railroads compete over larger geographic areas. As the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is the concentration of railroads calculated by county of origin, this index 
may prove to be increasingly irrelevant as railroads compete over larger geographic areas. 
In the next chapter, conclusions and policy implications are discussed. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the original intent of this study was to do a pre- and post-deregulation 
assessment of rail rates per ton-mile, the results using post-deregulation data show a 
significant decrease in rail rates between 1981 and 2000. When accounting for changes in 
shipment characteristics for wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean, rate savings were 
63.79%, 67.47%, 49.15%, 68.58%, and 58.89%, respectively. Rate savings due to time 
trend alone are 44.94%, 46.87%, 38.06%, 44.55%, and 36.32% for wheat, barley, com, oat, 
and soybean shippers, respectively.' 
Analysis of the variables affecting elasticities of demand for rail in a pre-
deregulation and post-deregulation study had to be modified to a post-deregulation study 
due to data issues. These data issues were inaccurate or missing observations2 for earlier 
pre-deregulation Annual Rail Waybill Sample Data and a written disclaimer by the Surface 
Board Transportation as to the accuracy of earlier Annual Rail Waybill Sample Data. 
'These results are similar to those found in other studies. For example, in the MacDonald 
(1989) study, between 1981 and 1985, wheat rates dropped an average of21.7%. During 
the same time period, this study found that wheat rates decreased 21.6%, accounting for 
changes in shipment characteristics. Com in MacDonald's study dropped 12.4%, 
accounting for changes in shipment characteristics. In comparison, com in this study 
decreased 13.05% during 1981-1985. In the Dennis (2000) study, rail rates for agricultural 
products during 1982-1996 dropped an average of 48.1 %. In this study, during the same 
time period, when combining wheat, com, and soybean movements, which account for 
92% of grain commodities, rail rates declined an average of 40%. 
20bservations for the variable short-line miles was missing between 1972 and 1984. 
Observations for weight per car, in some cases, were either under or overstated. 
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In spite of its modification, this study should prove to be useful in the assessment of 
the impacts deregulation has had on rail rates for grain shippers. By using data from 1981 
to 2000, time and other variables affecting elasticity of demand still provide important 
insight into the impact of deregulation on rail rates. 
In this study of wheat, barley, com, oat, and soybean, price differentiation is found 
to occur in two ways: by commodity and by geographic regions. As evidenced from the 
results, one of the implications of this study is, despite geographical and commodity 
differentiation, all shippers have experienced significant rail rate savings since 
deregulation. Barley was found to have the highest rate per ton-mile in 2000 at $.027 per 
ton-mile while, com and soybean are on the lower end of the spectrum at $.019 per ton-
mile. The tendency for railroads to implement more market-based pricing in recent years 
implies that rail demand elasticity is becoming an increasingly important factor in the 
relative competitiveness of U.S. grain producers. 
When analyzing the effects of deregulation on rail rates for com, soybean confirmed 
that rail rates not only differed across commodities, but also among regions. In general, it 
is found that grain producers within regions that had higher levels of intermodal 
competition had lower rates than their counterparts with lower levels of intermodal 
competition. Distribution of benefits, in the form of rate savings as a result ofmarket-
based pricing, has varied between regions, but all regions have experienced substantial 
benefits. 
Based on the results of this study, policy makers such as Congress, the Surface 
Transportation Board, and the United States Department of Agriculture, should not 
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consider regional reregulation, based on the simple fact that captive shippers have 
experienced significant declines in rail rates through gains in efficiency and productivity as 
a result of deregulation. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A. I. Simulation results: intennodal wheat model 
Distance Typical Simulated Simulated Percent 
to Barge of State 1981 RPTM 2000RPTM Rate Savings 
I $0.0305 $0.0101 67.02% 
50 WA, OH, IL, IN $0.0591 $0.0201 64.72% 
100 GA,IA $0.0665 $0.0237 64.29% 
200 MN,OK $0.0747 $0.0270 63.87% 
250 KS,NE $0.0776 $0.0281 63.73% 
300 SD $0.0800 $0.0291 63.61% 
400 ND $0.0840 $0.0307 63.43% 
500 WY,MT $0.0872 $0.0320 63.29% 
550 UT $0.0886 $0.0326 63.23% 
Table A.2. Simulation results: intramodal wheat model. 
Herflndex Simulated Simulated Percent 
1981 RPTM 2000RPTM Rate Savings 
.333* $0.0727 $0.0262 63.92% 
0.40 $0.0735 $0.0265 63.95% 
0.5 $0.0745 $0.0268 64.00% 
0.6 $0.0753 $0.0271 64.02% 
0.7 $0.0760 $0.0273 64.05% 
0.8 $0.0766 $0.0275 64.08% 
0.9 $0.0771 $0.0277 64.11% 
I $0.0776 $0.0277 64.13% 
* .333 = 3 Railroad's equal share. 
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Table A.3. Simulation results: intermodal barley model. 
Distance 
to Barge 
Typical 
of State 
Simulated Simulated Percent 
1981 RPTM 2000 RPTM Rate Savings 
1 $0.0508 $0.0110 78.35% 
50 WA, OH, IL, IN $0.0635 $0.0181 71.43% 
100 GA,IA $0.0660 $0.0198 70.00% 
200 MN,OK $0.0687 $0.0217 68.48% 
250 KS,NE $0.0696 $0.0223 67.98% 
300 SD $0.0703 $0.0228 67.56% 
400 ND $0.0714 $0.0237 66.89% 
500 WY,MT $0.0723 $0.0243 66.36% 
550 UT $0.0727 $0.0246 66.14% 
Table A.4. Simulation results: intrarnodal barley model. 
Herflndex Simulated Simulated Percent 
1981 RPTM 2000 RPTM Rate Savings 
.333* $0.0537 $0.0259 51.84% 
0.40 $0.0570 $0.0251 55.88% 
0.5 $0.0612 $0.0243 60.34% 
0.6 $0.0650 $0.0236 63.65% 
0.7 $0.0683 $0.0231 66.23% 
0.8 $0.0713 $0.0226 68.31% 
0.9 $0.0741 $0.0222 70.05% 
1 $0.0767 $0.0218 71.52% 
* .333 = 3 Railroad's equal share. 
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Table A.5. Simulation results: intermodal com model. 
Distance Typical Simulated Simulated Percent 
to Barge of State 1981 RPTM 2000RPTM Rate Savings 
1 $0.0328 $0.0196 40.36% 
50 WA, OH, IL, IN $0.0378 $0.0197 47.98% 
100 GA,IA $0.0388 $0.0197 49.23% 
200 MN,OK $0.0397 $0.0197 50.44% 
250 KS,NE $0.0401 $0.0197 50.83% 
300 SD $0.0403 $0.0197 51.14% 
400 ND $0.0408 $0.0197 51.63% 
500 WY,MT $0.0411 $0.0197 52.01% 
550 UT $0.0412 $0.0197 52.17% 
Table A.6. Simulation results: intramodal com model. 
Herf Index Simulated Simulated Percent 
1981 RPTM 2000 RPTM Rate Savings 
.333* $0.0393 $0.0175 55.42% 
0.40 $0.0391 $0.0180 54.11% 
0.5 $0.0390 $0.0185 52.47% 
0.6 $0.0388 $0.0190 51.08% 
0.7 $0.0387 $0.0194 49.87% 
0.8 $0.0386 $0.0198 48.81% 
0.9 $0.0385 $0.0201 47.79% 
I $0.0385 $0.0204 47.01% 
* .333 = 3 Railroad's equal share. 
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Table A.7. Simulation results: intermodal oat model. 
Distance Typical Simulated Simulated Percent 
to Barge of State 1981 RPTM 2000RPTM Rate Savings 
I $0.0700 $0.0202 71.10% 
50 WA, OH, IL, IN $0.0716 $0.0227 68.29% 
100 GA,IA $0.0719 $0.0232 67.76% 
200 MN,OK $0.0722 $0.0237 67.23% 
250 KS,NE $0.0723 $0.0238 67.05% 
300 SD $0.0723 $0.0239 66.91% 
400 ND $0.0724 $0.0241 66.68% 
500 WY,MT $0.0725 $0.0243 66.51% 
550 UT $0.0726 $0.0244 66.43% 
Table A.8. Simulation results: intramodal oat model. 
Herflndex Simulated Simulated Percent 
1981 RPTM 2000 RPTM Rate Savings 
.333* $0.0707 $0.0236 66.59% 
0.40 $0.071 $0.0234 67.01% 
0.5 $0.0713 $0.0232 67.51% 
0.6 $0.0716 $0.0230 67.92% 
0.7 $0.0718 $0.0228 68.26% 
0.8 $0.0720 $0.0227 68.55% 
0.9 $0.0722 $0.0226 68.81% 
I $0.0723 $0.0224 69.03% 
* .3 3 3 = 3 Railroad's equal share. 
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Table A.9. Simulation results: intennodal soybean model. 
Distance Typical Simulated Simulated Percent 
to Barge of State 1981 RPTM 2000RPTM Rate Savings 
1 $0.0456 $0.0136 70.28% 
50 WA, OH, IL, IN $0.0402 $0.0157 60.90% 
100 GA,lA $0.0394 $0.0162 58.96% 
200 MN,OK $0.0385 $0.0166 56.91% 
250 KS,NE $0.0382 $0.0167 56.23% 
300 SD $0.0380 $0.0169 55.67% 
400 ND $0.0377 $0.0170 54.77% 
500 WY,MT $0.0374 $0.0172 54.05% 
550 UT $0.0373 $0.0172 53.74% 
Table A.IO. Simulation results: intrarnodal soybean model. 
Herflndex Simulated Simulated Percent 
1981 RPTM 2000 RPTM Rate Savings 
.333* $0.0387 $0.0211 45.59% 
0.40 $0.0389 $0.0199 48.78% 
0.5 $0.0392 $0.0186 52.43% 
0.6 $0.0394 $0.0176 55.21% 
0.7 $0.0395 $0.0168 57.44% 
0.8 $0.0397 $0.0162 59.19% 
0.9 $0.0398 $0.0156 60.83% 
I $0.0399 $0.0151 62.18% 
* .333 = 3 Railroad's equal share. 
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Table A. I 1. Intermodal and intramodal elasticities for wheat, barley, corn, oats, and 
so bean. 
Wheat Barley Corn Oats Soybean 
lntermodal 1981 0.113 0.07 0.03 0.019 -0.011 
Elasticities 2000 0.13 0.14 - 0.005 0.043 0.059 
Intramodal 1981 0.059 0.32 -0.019 0.021 0.282 
Elasticities 2000 0.053 -0.154 0.139 -0.049 -0.048 
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